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early discovered to be unoccupied, and through which Gen. Thomas urged that he might throw his army. Gen. Cox also defends the assault on Kennesaw Mountain at considerable length. This, beyond question, was a grave blot on the long campaign to Atlanta. On this point, in opposition to Gen. Cox's view, it is sufficient to say that Gen. Thomas, Gen. McPherson, and Gen. Schofield, the three commanders of Sherman's armies, strongly condemned the assault as needless, as did also most of the corps commanders.

In treating of the Development of the March to the Sea General Cox ignores the fact, now fully made known by the discovery and printing in the War Records *Atlas* of General Grant's map sent to General Sherman before the Atlanta campaign began, which map demonstrates that General Grant originated a march to the sea to follow the capture of Atlanta. It is true that Sherman's plan differed from Grant's in that the latter contemplated the preliminary defeat of Hood's army.

General Force gives an excellent account of the March to the Sea, and the subsequent wonderful campaign through the Carolinas, but touches very lightly upon the wholly unnecessary escape of Hardee with his ten thousand from Savannah, which caused such sore dissatisfaction at Washington. Again, the reader does not receive any impression of the fact that Sherman's army was in great peril of being defeated in detail in its closing battle at Bentonville. The chapter by General Force on the Sherman terms for Johnston's surrender is the best account in condensed form yet published. It fails, however, to take note of the fact that those terms, in nearly all their essentials, were drafted by John H. Reagan, the Confederate Postmaster-General. His original draft of these terms has been in the possession of the War Department since the close of the war.

It is the final chapter by General Cox, entitled Post-Bellum, which will cause the student of the war to most sharply regret that General Force had not been able to write the entire volume. While it might not have been more readable, it would have been free from insidious efforts to sustain previous unfair estimates of General Thomas by private letters which will not stand the test of the official records. It is unfortunate that a volume so entertaining, and excellent in the main, and especially that so interesting and valuable a closing chapter should be marred by such errors as have been pointed out in this brief review, and which a competent editing with the open official record at hand would so easily have avoided.

Thaddeus Stevens. BY SAMUEL W. MCCALL. [American Statesmen.] (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1899. Pp. vi, 369.)

IF there is ground for supposing that the editor of the "American Statesmen" series had to cope with certain doubts and questionings before including Stevens in the list of subjects, it is beyond all controversy that the result has vindicated the wisdom of his decision. Mr. McCall has produced as judicious and useful a volume as any in the series.

This success has been achieved through a somewhat unusual conception of a biography. The first sixty-eight years of Stevens's life are but scantily treated, while the last eight—1860-1868—are made to bring him within the category of statesmen. In the long prelude to this final period Stevens appears as an able and successful lawyer, a shrewd but less successful business man, and a politician of little reputation save for partisan bitterness. Through anti-masonry, anti-Jacksonism and anti-slavery, he passed ultimately into the Republican party, and in the accession of that party to power found the opportunity for the display of his peculiar endowments on a national scale. Prior to this time he had served some years in the legislature of Pennsylvania, and three terms in Congress. Except in connection with the promotion of free schools in his state, he had been identified with no great project of public policy, and in Congress he had exhibited his ability only as the most violent of the anti-slavery extremists.

Upon the organization of the Thirty-Seventh Congress, in July, 1861, Stevens was made chairman of the committee on ways and means and thus became leader of the majority in the House of Representatives. This leadership he retained throughout the Civil War and the decisive phases of the reconstruction. As to his qualifications for the task of driving through under whip and spur the constructive legislation required by the crisis of our national life, the records leave no room for doubt. His contempt for discussion when the emergency required action was no less conspicuous and no less effective than that of the recently retired Speaker of the House. As a parliamentary leader Stevens established his reputation on an unassailable foundation. But statesmanship stands on rather a different basis. Devising policies calls for a different order of intellect from that displayed in passing bills. Mr. McCall's discussion tends often to obscure the distinction between Stevens and the committees of which he was chairman, and to ascribe to him the credit (or discredit) for all the measures that he reported. It appears clearly enough, however, that Stevens was personally a strong advocate of the legal-tender laws; that he pressed for measures of confiscation far surpassing in severity those actually adopted, and that he regarded as hopelessly ineffective the policy of emancipation which was put in operation by the President. Whether his judgment on these points was that of sound statesmanship, may well be doubted, though Mr. McCall makes a very striking presentation of the considerations that might justify the ideas of Stevens, particularly on the monetary question.

It was in connection with reconstruction that Stevens's view of what should be the government's policy had the most remarkable history. From the outbreak of the war he consistently maintained that the acts of secession terminated the constitutional existence of the states that passed them, and on this idea he reared his theory that with the triumph of the national arms the status of the conquered regions would be merely that of subject provinces. Mr. McCall traces very fairly the development of this theory, from the time when its enunciation was received with general

horror, to what he calls its "complete triumph" in the Reconstruction Acts of 1867. Though the career of the Stevens doctrine was very remarkable, its ultimate triumph was in reality something less than complete. This evidence lies in the fact, which the author cannot understand (p. 290), that Stevens strenuously opposed the insertion of the so-called "Blaine Amendment" in the act of March 2, 1867. Stevens perceived that this amendment detracted from the simple and unqualified assertion of military authority by the government, and recognized a right of the Southerners to ultimate representation in Congress. His theory denied absolutely any such right, for conquered enemies have no constitutional rights. The act as passed embodied rather more distinctly the Sumner than the Stevens shade of theory; but of the existence of the state-suicide theory Mr. McCall gives no intimation.

In keeping with the general character of the series, this volume embodies a general view of the political history of the time covered by the greatest activity of the subject. This part of the work is eminently satisfactory. The temper of the author is admirable, his information is adequate, and his judgments are sound. A statement here and there may appear a little misleading. On page 101 the repeal of the Missouri Compromise is attributed to "the aggressive slavery party"—the more conspicuous agency of Douglas being ignored. On page 110 it is said: "But scarcely had the compromise of 1850 become operative when the friends of slavery secured its repeal." This is unintelligible. On page 148 the Crittenden resolution of 1861 is represented by implication as having been formally enacted; this is not precisely the case, as the House form and the Senate form differed slightly from each other.

WM. A. DUNNING.

An accident not to have been foreseen has deprived us of the pleasure of inserting in the present number a review, by a most competent expert in matters of education, of the report which the Committee of Seven has presented to the American Historical Association, and which has been printed in a small and inexpensive volume entitled *The Study of History in Schools* (Macmillan, pp. ix, 267). The formal review is, we hope, only delayed. Yet the book is so important and so interesting to teachers, and so much deserves their attention at the beginning of the scholastic year, that we do not think it advisable to permit our October number to appear without at least a statement of the nature of the book, and of what the teacher may expect to find between its tasteful covers. The committee was appointed in December, 1896, to consider the subject of history in the secondary schools and to draw up a scheme of college entrance requirements in history. The members were Professor A. C. McLaughlin of the University of Michigan, chairman; Professor H. B. Adams of the Johns Hopkins University, Mr. George L. Fox of the Hopkins Grammar School, Professor A. B. Hart of Harvard University, Professor C. H. Haskins of the University of Wisconsin, Miss Lucy M. Salmon, professor in Vassar College, and Professor H. M. Stephens of